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Capital Structure of Internet Companies: Case Study 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We analyze the financing decisions and capital structure of internet companies and 
relate observed findings to the common capital structure theories. Large internet 
companies usually have low debt and small internet companies have high debt. We 
find that the trade-off theory of capital structure, pecking order theory, market timing 
theory and other theories cannot individually explain a firm’s capital structure. 
However, they can compliment each other in describing some patterns of observed 
behavior. We also suggest a number of recommendations for capital structure theory 
and practice. 
 
1. Introduction 
The modern theory of capital structure began with the famous proposition of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) that described the conditions of capital structure 
irrelevance.  Since then, many theories of capital structure have been developed 
including trade off theory, pecking order theory, agency cost theory, life cycle theory 
and flexibility theory. After so many innovations, capital structure remains one of the 
most controversial and debatable issue in corporate finance. 
The key issues are as follows. First, an immense gap exists between theories 
and practice. Graham and Harvey (2001) found that less than 50% of theoretical ideas 
find some support among managers. Second, there are big differences in the 
researchers’ opinion. For example, Chirinko and Singha (2000), Leary and Roberts 
(2010) and Frank and Goyal (2003) claim that trade-off theory drives capital structure 
decisions while Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Lemmon and Zender (2008) 
claim that pecking-order theory drives capital structure. Third, there is difference 
among opinions about the direction that future work on capital structure should take. 
For instance, Harris and Raviv (1991) argue that asymmetric information theories of 
capital structure are not promising. However, the stream of research related to 
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asymmetric information has not stopped since then.
1
 Furthermore, the financial crisis 
during 2008 and 2009 showed that corporate managers appeared to lack an 
understanding of the role of asymmetric information. The market for 
mortgage-backed securities, which many believe was at the core of financial crisis, 
involved asymmetric information between investors and issuers. Various scandals, 
such as the one involving Bernie Madoff, illustrate the depth of asymmetric 
information problems between firms’ insiders and investors.  
   The present paper attempts to analyze issues described above. We look at 
current practices of internet companies and compare them to existing theories. We 
analyze the current practice of 71 companies including 29 large companies and 42 
small companies.
2
  The size of the companies is from 40 million to 223.48 billion.  
With the help of spreadsheet analysis we first find an optimal capital structure for a 
given company. Spreadsheet analysis is mostly based on the trade-off between tax 
advantages of debt and increasing risk from debt financing. This analysis implies that 
large companies in the Internet industry are underleveraged.  For example, for 
Google Inc., the optimal debt ratio is 16.2% and the current debt ratio is just 8.8%.  
We also find that most small companies in the Internet industry are overleveraged.  
For example, the optimal debt ratio for Ediets.Com Inc is 0%, but the current debt 
ratio is as high as 59.54%.   
   We then describe other factors that have not been taken into consideration in 
the spreadsheet analysis, which affect managers’ decisions on company’s capital 
structure. We find that no single theory of capital structure can explain the observed 
patterns of capital structure in internet industry. The trade-off theory of capital 
structure is unable to accurately explain why only a small fraction of firms that are 
increasingly profitable utilize debt as a source of financing. Spreadsheet analysis 
shows that firm’s current capital structures are distant from their optimal.  Also we 
find that the pecking order theory’s prioritization of sources of financing is only 
maintained in certain situations. For example, we see that younger firms and other 
                                                             
1
See, for example, Klein (2002) and  Miglo (2010, 2011).  
2
See Appendix 1. 
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firms who undergo high-growth periods with net losses do not utilize debt before 
equity financing. Most companies issued equity through an initial public offering 
before utilizing debt which opposes what is expected from the pecking order theory.
 The market timing theory pays tribute to some actions taken by nearly every firm 
in our sample. For example, nearly all companies issue equity through public 
offerings at opportune times, most notably during the “tech craze” or “dot.com 
bubble” of the late 1990s. We also see firms undergo public offerings when the market 
has recovered from the tech crash of 2000 or at other times when management feels 
their stock is overvalued. We see companies make stock repurchases at windows of 
opportunities where they believe their stock is undervalued. However, from a broader 
point of view, the market timing theory is limited in explaining firm’s capital structure 
besides IPO decision.  
    Flexibility is largely unexplored area of capital structure that can explain many 
patterns of capital structure for internet industries. Both equity and debt holders do 
place value on flexibility, especially in the recent years of turmoil in capital markets. 
Internet companies seem to put an especial emphasis on flexibility when managing 
their capital structures given the innovative nature of their industry.  
    There is a “home bias” in capital structure for most companies in our sample. 
Internet companies can use international financing more efficiently. Some reasons for 
that include the availability of lower interest rates, flexible regulation for dynamic 
companies, no capitalization restrictions, reducing interest rate risk by using flexible 
interest rates in markets which have low correlation between each other, using modern 
financing arrangements like international project financing or non-recourse debt to 
mitigate agency problems.   
    Small internet companies should have less debt. Using a lot of debt by small 
companies is inconsistent with almost any existing theory of capital structure.  
    Credit rating concerns are unexplored area of capital structure theory. The capital 
structure management of large internet companies is strongly consistent with the view 
that managers are deeply concerned about ratings.  
     With regard to existing theories our analysis revealed that any single theory has 
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major problems in explaining capital structure management of internet companies. It 
suggests that a unified approach should be developed in near future. Also we disagree 
with Harris and Raviv (1991) that asymmetric information theories are less promising. 
We find that asymmetric information is important in explaining many patterns of 
capital structure behavior of internet companies but managers do not have a practical 
tool to use it more efficiently. At the same time given that the gap between theory and 
practice is very large, we agree with Harris and Raviv (1991) in that the door is still 
widely open for new theory of capital structure which can be helpful to make a bridge 
between theory and practice of capital structure.      
     The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes internet 
industry. Section 3 presents a review of capital structure theories. Section 4 describes 
in details the analytical method used in the paper and the spreadsheet used to analyze 
firm’s capital structure. Section 5 provides detailed examples of some firms capital 
structure analysis. Section 6 presents the results of firm’s capital structure analysis and 
the conclusion is drawn in Section 7. 
 
2. The internet industry 
The internet started out as an American military project in the 1950-60s and has 
evolved into a modern mainstream phenomenon. It is used by common businesses  
for  marketing  and  sales,  for  searching  and  sharing  of  files (including 
documents, audio and video files) by businesses and households, and  it  is  even  
used  to  facilitate  online  communities  with  forums  and “blogging” with 
popular websites such as Facebook, Twitter and Youtube. The Internet has 
revolutionized the computer and communications world like nothing before. The 
Internet is at once a world-wide broadcasting capability, a mechanism for information 
dissemination, and a medium for collaboration and interaction between individuals 
and their computers without regard for geographic location. The Internet represents 
one of the most successful examples of the benefits of sustained investment and 
commitment to research and development of information infrastructure. Beginning 
with the early research in packet switching, the government, industry and academia 
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have been partners in evolving and deploying this exciting new technology.  
In the technology industry, one kind of the companies is pretty famous which is 
called information provider companies. It may sound unfamiliar for most people. 
However, most people are familiar with Internet search engine companies like 
worldwide Google, Yahoo, Baidu and so on. Many people probably depend on these 
internet search engine companies when they use internet to search. These internet 
search engine companies are also called information provider companies which 
provide different information to various customers. For instance, the famous search 
engine company Google can provide a tool to help customers to acquire wanted 
information. However, different information providers can provide different types of 
information. Like Youku, a video sharing website, can provide all types of videos 
information.  With the development of the industry, new information provider 
companies like Facebook and LinkedIn can help people to establish connection and 
share information with others. In the information provider industry, companies 
provide information in different ways, but the basic concept is to provide the needed 
information to customers.  
In the Internet industry, the leader companies and the laggards have the big 
difference in Market Cap, long term debt to equity, P/E, net profit margin and other 
aspects. For instance, the leader companies, Google, Yahoo and Baidu, have the 
market cap of $272.1B, $321.9B and $380.4B. On the contrary, some small 
companies like, VRX Worldwide, Inc, Armada Data Corp, Alphinat Inc. have 
relatively small market cap of $1.0 M, $1.8M and $1.9M. P/E is also very different 
among different companies. For instance, Facebook that held its initial public offering 
(IPO) on May 18, 2012, has a P/E of 1805.33. Google has its P/E ratio of 25.62. Most 
of the big companies have high net profit margin. For instance, Google has the net 
profit margin of 20%, and Yahoo has the similar net profit margin of 20.23%. 
Compared to Google and Yahoo, Baidu has the highest net profit margin of 44.12%. 
Small companies have the various net profit margin some companies have relatively 
high net profit margin. Atrinsic, Inc. has a market cap of $0.13M and has a net profit 
margin of -36.7%. eMedia Networks also has a relatively small market cap of $0.4M. 
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However, it has a quite different net profit margin of 11.59 compared with Atrinsic, 
Inc -36.7%. 
 
3. Capital structure theories 
This section describes capital structure theories. We also discuss some 
challenges faced by each theory that provides a basic for further discussions about 
existing practices in capital structure theory and management.
3
  
3.1. Trade-off theory 
      In contrast to dividends, interest paid on debt reduces the firm’s taxable income. 
Debt also increases the probability of bankruptcy. Trade-off theory suggests that 
capital structure reflects a trade-off between the tax benefits of debt and the expected 
costs of bankruptcy (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973). Miglo (2010) suggests a model 
where optimal debt level is given by the following:  
                                
   
   
                          (1) 
Here R  stands for maximal earnings,  T  is corporate tax rate and k measures 
bankruptcy costs.  
If k  is higher in (1), the equilibrium level of D  should be lower. As the 
expected bankruptcy costs increase, the advantages of using equity also increase. This 
result has several interpretations. Large firms should have more debt because they are 
more diversified and have lower default risk. Tangible assets suffer a smaller loss of 
value when firms go into distress. Hence, firms with more tangible assets should have 
higher leverage compared to those that have more intangible assets, such as research 
firms. Growth firms tend to lose more of their value than non-growth firms when they 
go into distress. Thus, theory predicts a negative relationship between leverage and 
growth.  
When T  increases in Equation 1, debt should also increase because higher 
taxes lead to a greater tax advantage of using debt. Hence, firms with higher tax rates 
                                                             
3
For a more detailed review of capital structure theory see, for instance, Miglo (2010). 
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should have higher debt ratios compared to firms with lower tax rates. Inversely, firms 
that have substantial non-debt tax shields such as depreciation should be less likely to 
use debt than firms that do not have these tax shields. If tax rates increase over time, 
debt ratios should also increase. Debt ratios in countries where debt has a much larger 
tax benefit should be higher than debt ratios in countries whose debt has a lower tax 
benefit.  
 As suggested in (1), if R  increases, D  should also increase. Thus, more 
profitable firms should have more debt. Expected bankruptcy costs are lower and 
interest tax shields are more valuable for profitable firms.  
   Although trade-off theory predicts that the marginal tax benefit of debt should be 
equal to the marginal expected bankruptcy cost, the empirical evidence is mixed. 
Some researchers argue that the former is greater than the latter because direct 
bankruptcy costs are small and the level of debt is below optimal (Graham, 2000). 
Others find that indirect bankruptcy costs can total as much as 25 percent to 30 
percent of assets value and are thus comparable with tax benefits of debt (Molina, 
2005; Almeida and Philippon, 2007). Additionally, including personal taxation in the 
basic model can reduce the tax advantage of debt (Green and Hollifield, 2003; Gordon 
and Lee, 2007) because tax rates on the return from equity such as dividends or 
capital gain are often reduced. 
Trade-off theory of capital structure is a foundation of spreadsheet analysis 
described in Section 4. The spreadsheet analysis takes into account taxes and also 
increasing risk from debt financing.  
3.2. Other theories of capital structure  
3.2.1. Pecking-order theory. 
 The key element of pecking-order theory is asymmetric information between 
firm’s insiders and outsiders. Information asymmetries exist in almost every facet of 
corporate finance and complicate managers’ ability to maximize firm values. 
Managers of good quality firms face the challenge of directly convincing investors 
about the true quality of their firm especially if this concerns future performance. As a 
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result, investors try to incorporate indirect evidence in their valuation of firm 
performance by analyzing information-revealing actions including capital structure 
choice. 
 Myers and Majluf (1984) set forth pecking order theory. Equity is dominated by 
internal funds in pecking order theory. Low-quality firms use equity as much as 
internal funds but high-quality firms prefer internal funds because shares issued by the 
company can only be sold with discount (i.e. below their true value) because of 
imperfect information problems. Similarly debt dominates equity. Debt suffers from 
miss valuation less than equity. The same holds if the firm has available 
assets-in-place. Hence a “pecking order” emerges: internal funds, debt, and equity 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
    Good-quality firms tend to use internal funds for financing as much as possible. 
Because low-quality firms do not have as much profits and retained earnings as 
high-quality firms, they use external sources, usually debt, more frequently. This helps 
to explain the described above puzzle about the negative correlation between debt and 
profitability. 
   Also pecking order theory predicts that a higher extent of asymmetric information 
reduces the incentive to issue equity.  
3.2.2 Signaling                 
     In the pecking order model, good quality firms have to use internal funds to 
avoid adverse selection problems and losing value. These firms cannot signal their 
quality by changing their capital structure. In signaling theory capital structure serves 
as a signal of private information (Ross, 1977). If a separating equilibrium exists, 
high-quality firms issue debt and low-quality firms issue equity. The empirical 
prediction is that firm value (or profitability) and the debt-to-equity ratio is positively 
related. The evidence, however, is ambiguous. Most empirical studies report a 
negative relationship between leverage and profitability as discussed earlier. In a 
similar spirit, some studies document the superior absolute performance of 
equity-issuing firms before and immediately after the issue (Jain and Kini, 1994; 
Loughran and Ritter, 1997). Several studies examine long-term firm performance 
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following capital structure changes. Shah (1994) reports that business risk falls after 
leverage-increasing exchange offers but rises after leverage-decreasing exchange 
offers. Jain and Kini (1994), Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1997), and Loughran and 
Ritter (1997) document the long-run operating underperformance of equity issuing 
firms compared to non-issuing firms. 
3.2.3. Agency cost-based theories of capital structure  
 Agency costs arise because managers do not necessarily act in the best interests 
of shareholders who also may not act in the best interests of creditors. Including 
agency costs in the basic model can help to explain some problems of trade-off theory 
discussed above such as debt conservatism.  
If an investment yields large returns, equity holders capture most of the gains. If, 
however, the investment fails, debt holders bear the consequences. As a result, equity 
holders may benefit from investing in highly risky projects, even if the projects are 
value decreasing. Jensen and Meckling (1976) call this the “asset substitution effect.” 
Debt holders can correctly anticipate equity holders’ future behavior. This leads to a 
decrease in the value of debt and reduces the incentive to issue debt. Myers (1977) 
observes that when firms are likely to go bankrupt in the near future, equity holders 
may have no incentive to contribute new capital to invest in value-increasing projects. 
Equity holders bear the entire cost of the investment, but the returns from the 
investment may be captured mainly by the debt holders (“debt overhang”).   
 On the other hand, some agency theories favor higher debt. For example, Jensen 
(1986) argues that debt improves the discipline of an entrenched manager (so called 
“debt and discipline” theory).  
3.2.4. Flexibility theory of capital structure and life cycle theory of capital structure. 
Firms in the development stage have little favorable track record (i.e., credit 
ratings) of borrowing (Diamond, 1991) and are most likely to be turned down for 
credit when they need it the most. Thus, firms in the development stage that have little 
financial flexibility will abstain from issuing risky debt and will instead issue equity. 
Firms in the maturity stage begin generating positive earnings and have more 
financial flexibility than developing firms. Accordingly, these firms rely more on debt 
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financing to fund their investments as they face less financing constraints and as they 
expect to repay their debt with growing future earnings.  
    Flexibility theory finds some support in empirical studies (Byoun, 2008) and 
managers’ surveys (Graham and Harvey, 2001). This theory helps to explain why 
small and risky firms issue equity and why these firms do not follow pecking-order 
theory. Gamba and Triantis (2008) develop a theoretical model that analyzes optimal 
capital structure policy for a firm that values flexibility in the presence of personal 
taxes and transaction costs. The importance of financial flexibility as compared to 
major theories of capital structure remains an open question. More work that 
compares flexibility theory with other theories is expected. Also it was noted that 
many young firms especially venture firms do not issue common equity but rather 
convertible preferred equity which resembles debt more than equity.  
     Life cycle theory of capital structure argues that besides financial flexibility 
there are other factors which can explain financing patterns of firms in different stages 
of their development (Damodaran, 2003). Start-up firms do not have much profit, so 
the tax advantage of debt is not as important as for a mature firm. The start-up firms 
do not require incentives for managers since there is no large separation between 
ownership and management like in the case of big public corporations. This leads to 
the idea that mature firms value debt more compared to start-up firms. To what extent 
the life cycle theory represents a separate theory of capital structure rather than a 
combination of arguments from other theories remains an open question.     
4. Method of research. 
    The choice of case study approach is motivated by the following. First, there are a 
number of researchers calling for more case studies in capital structure management 
(Graham and Harvey, 2001). Second, case study is an effective way of research in areas 
which include several layers of analysis and different approaches and theories. Section 
3 suggests that capital structure management represents such an area. There is a lot of 
competing theories of capital structure. Furthermore one of our main objectives is to 
find firms’ optimal capital structure policies (as opposite to existing policies). Some of 
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the theories are better formalized and make it more simple for managers to use in real 
life situations (such as trade-off theory) while others are far from that (such as 
asymmetric information). The case study is simply the best research strategy because 
the problem under study is to reach understanding in a complex context (Singleton, 
Straits, and Straits (1993), Mertens (1998)). Campbell (1989) advocates a case study 
design for investigating real-life events, including organizational and managerial 
processes. Third, available sample for capital structure management analysis of large 
companies is small so our sample covers a good fraction of firms.  
We analyze companies’ capital structure using the following questions (see Miglo 
(2010) for more details).  
1.  What is the firm’s current debt/equity ratio? 
2.  Is the firm’s debt/equity ratio low or high compared with other firms at the same 
industry or related industries? 
3.  Is the firm’s current debt/equity ratio explained by the firm’s financial policy or 
by the current market conditions?  
4.  What is the firm’s optimal capital structure according to WACC (weighted 
average cost of capital) approach? 
5.  If current debt/equity ratio different from optimal, then what factors, which are 
not taken into consideration in the spreadsheet analysis may explain this difference? 
When working on above questions we use spreadsheet analysis along with capital 
structure theories. These theories are Pecking-Order Theory, Trade-Off Theory, 
Agency Cost, Flexibility and some others described in previous chapter.  
Questions 1, 2 and 4 deal with financial calculations. By doing so, we can find out 
the company’s Debt/Equity Ratio and its WACC. WACC is the expected return on all 
of a company’s securities. It is calculated by multiplying the cost of each capital 
component by its proportional weight and then summing: 
WACC= (E/V)rE+ (D/V)rD(1-TC) 
    Here D and E are the market value of the firm’s debt and equity, V=D+E is the 
firm’s total market value, rD and rE are the cost of debt and equity, and TC is the 
marginal corporate tax rate. We take tax into consideration, since interest paid on a 
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firm’s borrowing can be deducted from taxable income, which is the so called tax 
benefit. 
   To get the optimal capital structure, we change D/(D+E) ratio from 0% to 100% 
as hypotheses, and calculate several financial parameters for different ratios. Then 
we find one that has minimal WACC and respectively maximal market value for the 
firm.  
More specifically, we first calculate β: 
β=[1+(1- TC)D/E] β0
4
 
Then, we calculate rE and rD by the following equations: 
rE=Current Short Term Government Rate + β×Risk Premium 
rD=Risk-Free Interest + Default Premium
5
 
Then, we calculate the WACC based on the equation above, list all the WACC for 
different D/(D+E) ratios, and finally find the minimum WACC from the list which 
corresponds to the optimal capital structure. 
   With regard to question 3, we usually look at the firm’s debt/equity ratio over the 
last few years. We find for example, that the Oracle’s D/E ratio was growing from 
2005 to 2008. With a further study, we believe a part of the reason for the growing 
D/E ratio is Oracle’s financial policy, when the company aggressively purchased 
several competitors during that period and accumulated a large amount of debt.  
As to question 5, we find that the optimal debt/equity ratio (based on spreadsheet 
analysis) of eBay’s is significantly higher than its current ratio. We suggest that this 
happened because high bankruptcy cost of the industry and the needs for flexibility 
for future financing are not taken into consideration in the WACC approach. We hold 
the view that eBay invested so much money, time and effort to develop specific 
products, that the consequence can be very serious if it fails due to a large amount of 
debt. The primary reason is the company’s large proportion of intellectual property 
which cannot be quickly converted to cash in a financial distress situation. Moreover, 
                                                             
4 This is Ito formula. β0 refers to the “unlevered” beta of the company. 
5
 Default premium depends on the company’s  credit rating that ranges from  AAA to D. It depends in 
turn on such parameters as interest coverage ratio.  
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the e-commerce industry is still in its growth stage, the future financing requirements 
of the industry are unknown, therefore issuing stocks to finance today’s capital needs 
leaves firms with more flexibility for future financing than borrowing money. 
We also find that the agency cost for Microsoft is relatively low, and we explain 
this phenomenon by pointing out that the biggest shareholder of Microsoft – Bill 
Gates – has been deeply involved in company’s management. When there are fewer 
conflicts between managers and shareholders, there would be less agency cost. 
   We use an excel file that is divided into following parts
6
: Inputs, Operating lease 
information, Debt, Tax rate, and Calculations. Inputs part has three components, 
financial information, market information, and general market data. Financial 
information includes earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (EBITDA) and 
depreciation and amortization. Market information includes number of shares 
outstanding, market price per share, Beta of the company. Current long-term 
government bond rate, short-term interest rate, risk premium, and country default 
spread are in the general market data.  
     Operating lease expenses are really financial expenses, and should be treated as 
such. Accounting standards allow them to be treated as operating expenses. In this 
part, we convert commitments to make operating leases into debt and adjust the 
operating income accordingly, by adding back the imputed interest expense on this 
debt. 
     In the debt part, we find each company’s book value and market value of debt. 
In each kind of value, we find companies’ bank medium-term debt, bank long-term 
debt, bonds, unsecured debentures and notes, senior debt securities, senior 
medium-term notes, subordinated medium-term notes, and other notes. Then, based 
on firms’ income statement, we find their earnings before tax and provision for taxes 
in the recent three years. Then we calculate their average tax rate in three years. 
The calculation part includes the following parts: 
1. Input data; 
                                                             
6 For more details, see Appendix 2-6.
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2. Interest coverage ratios, rating of debt, default spreads, interest rates and 
probabilities of default. 
3. Current situation; 
4. Capital structure and cost of capital calculation; 
5. Main results. 
We find most data about the company (earnings, expenditures, depreciation etc.) 
from yahoo finance and edumarketinsight website (educational version of Standard 
and Poors data base) for which we had passwords provided together with textbooks 
(usually it was “Principles of corporate finance” by Brealey and Myers). Default 
spreads, risk premiums and other information for point 2 could be found on 
bondsonline website or on Federal Reserve website. Points 3-5 represent calculations. 
     We calculate D/(D+E) ratio, Beta of the firm, cost of equity, cost of debt, 
WACC, market value of firm, and market price/share.  
5. Examples of company capital structure analysis  
     We divide all companies into two groups, the large companies and the small 
companies. The large companies are market cap larger than 1 billion dollars (for 
example Google and Yahoo), and the small companies are market cap smaller than 1 
billion dollars (for example Move and Look Smart). This section presents the analysis 
of these companies. The following tables show calculation results. 
5.1. Google  
Table 1. Results from Google Analysis 2013 
 Current Capital 
Structure 
Optimal Capital 
Structure 
Change 
D/(D+E) Ratio 4.02% 10.01% 5.99% 
Beta for the Stock 1.03 1.07 0.04 
Cost of Equity 10.06% 10.51% 0.45% 
Cost of Debt 2.47% 2.47% 0.00% 
WACC 9.76% 9.70% -0.06% 
Firm Value (mln.) 273458 274988  1,530 
Value/share  797 801 4.00 
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Google is a success story. Google’s mission is to organize the world’s information and 
make it universally accessible and useful for generations to come. Google has a vision 
of expanding their resources while keeping its edge in the market. The acquisitions of 
related newborns and continuous launches of diverse and unique products indicate its 
push for growth and profitability while utilizing all the available resources possible. 
Google started its journey back in 1995 with having a garage office and ended up 
announcing Initial Public Offering of 19,605,052 shares of Class A common stock that 
took place on Wall Street on August 18, 2004 which was highly awaited decision for 
public and as a result, the company’s liquidity increased.  On December 31, 2004, 
Google had $2,132.3 million of cash, cash equivalents and marketable securities, 
compared to $334.7 million and $146.3 million at the year-ends of 2003 and 2002 
respectively. Since this time Google has mainly held on to these additional cash flows 
holding over $3.5 billion in cash and cash equivalents in 2005 and 2006 to the date 
when Google shares jumped to an all-time high above $1,000 after the search engine 
giant reported a surge in mobile and video advertising that helped drive quarterly 
revenue up 23 percent in 2013.  
Capital structure  
Google uses more equity financing rather than debt financing as it evolved from 
introductory to growing stage over the years. Google changed its debt/assets ratio 
from 4.7% to 8.4% during 2010 and 2012 and now back to the 4.02% in 2013. 
Google’s cash flow and profit are so strong that they can finance the business with 
retained earnings.  
    Trade off theory states that the capital structure is the result of a trade-off 
between the tax advantage of debt and higher risk and bankruptcy costs resulting from 
debt financing. Spreadsheet analysis suggests that Google’s optimal debt ratio is 
10.01%, however, its current debt ratio is 4.02%.  
The pecking order theory implies that the company should use internal funds before 
using debt and equity and should use external debt before external equity. Google uses 
internal funds and equity but not debt which means Google considered going for IPO 
before debt which contradicts the pecking order theory. Second, this theory implies 
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negative correlation between debt and profitability which is true as Google is making 
profit although not using a lot of debt. At the time of IPO, Google had enough profits to 
keep its operation running but still, rather taking more debt, Google decided to gather 
funds through equity. The reasons for Google to go public were these in accordance 
with “Letter from the Founders,” published in 2010. It follows from that document that 
Google could restructure to get back below 500 shareholders (meaning, essentially, 
find a way to buy back shares from our employees) or it could continue to be a private 
company but at the same time live with having to report its financial results like any 
public company or it could go public. The latter will help to create a market for firm 
shares including shares belonging to employees.  
    On one hand, the agency cost theory favors low debt implying low bankruptcy 
cost and high level of confidence for investors. This is consistent with Google’s 
policies. On the other hand, the agency cost theory states higher debt is good for a 
company because it can stimulate manager to perform better. This part is not 
consistent with Google case. In Google’s case, the conflict between shareholders and 
managers has low importance as the company is very profitable. In the long term the 
things may change. An important indicator of potential conflict between shareholders 
and managers is the fraction of shares owned by managers. In Google case it is 4% 
(see Table 2) that is much smaller than for example in Microsoft case. At the same the 
total number of shareholders is quite large. We believe that Google use partial 
ownership in terms of involvement of employees in shareholdings as a tool to 
motivate personnel to perform efficiently instead of external pressure by creditors. 
Although by issuing shares Google might be sharing ownership with different groups 
of people, but it is avoiding the risk to let go company’s control in few hands. The 
conflict between creditors and shareholders is not likely to happen because Google 
has less concern for creditors issue as it has less debt. According to the Google policy, 
the board of directors has an obligation to Monitor and Manage Potential Conflicts of 
Interest. The Board will also ensure that there is no abuse of corporate assets or 
unlawful related party transactions. One of the reasons why Google wanted to go 
public rather than using debt could be to have fewer conflicts between company and 
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outsiders. 
Table 2. Information about Google. 
Equity  GOOG 
Market Cap (Mln.) 285,019 
# of Institution Owners 2,800 
# of Fund Owners 4,574 
% Owned by Institutions 72.63 
% Owned by Funds 38.47 
% Owned by Insiders 0.04 
 
    As the flexibility theory and life cycle theory propose it is not beneficial for 
new firms to use debt financing, they rely more on equity to make their operations 
smooth at early stage of their existence so they are considered more flexible. Google 
expansion and growth business approach requires a lot of funds. Google historically 
pays cash for acquisition and expansion (except YouTube deal). The initial public 
offering in August of 2004 raised $1,161.1M to help the company growth. The 
performance of Google while using equity as core source of financing became better 
since 2004. In 2004 Google has 170, 601 shares valued at $34M and in 2005, Google 
acquired nine companies and all of the assets of another six other companies for a 
total amount of $130.5M of cash. Google continued with the acquisition of YouTube 
in 2008, AdMob in 2010, Zagat in 2011, Motorola Mobility in 2012 and Waze in 
2013.  
    According to life cycle theory for growing and mature firms it is more likely to 
have higher leverage ratio which would result in low flexibility. It is opposite in 
Google’s case as it does not use a lot of debt. The Debt/equity ratio for Google in 
2004 was higher than in 2013.  
   The signaling theory states that from the investors’ perspective, the market 
reaction on issuance of debt is neutral and of equity is negative.  In Google’s case, 
the issuance of shares at different stages made it successful and profitable so it’s a 
different outcome of the signaling theory.  
http://www.linkedin.com/today/post/article/20130913153717-7298-when-google-went-public 
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5.2. Yahoo! Inc.  
Table 3. Results from Yahoo Analysis 2013 
  
D/(D+E) 
Ratio 
Beta for 
the  
Stock  
Cost of 
Equity    
Cost of 
Debt  WACC % 
Market Value of 
Firm   
Current 
capital 
structure 6.30% 0.92 8.33% 1.04% 7.87 39369059976  
Optimal 
capital 
structure 25.00% 1.07 9.41% 2.14% 7.59 40814194602  
Change 18.70% 0.15 1.08% 1.10% 0.28 
 
1445134,626 
 
Yahoo first appeared online in 1994 while the company’s founders, David Filo 
and Jerry Yang, were still students at university. The Company was later incorporated 
in March 1995 and completed its initial public offering on April 12 1996. Yahoo is the 
second largest firm in the internet information providers industry and is the main rival 
of the industry leader Google. Yahoo currently is a highly profitable and established 
company.  
    The big internet companies like Yahoo started life conservatively, preferring to 
avoid debt and use the enormous amount of free cash flow that their businesses throw 
off every year to grow their businesses. 
1. Is Yahoo’s current debt/equity ratio high or low?  
Yahoo! Inc.’s debt/equity ratio is low. Yahoo! Inc. currently has a debt/equity 
ratio of 6.3% and their optimal ratio is around 25%. Google has a debt/equity ratio 
of 4.02% and Microsoft has 20.24%.  
2. Is Yahoo’s current debt/equity ratio explained by the firm’s financial policy or by 
the current market conditions? 
     Yahoo’s debt/equity is affected by both their policy and market conditions. 
Between 2004-2010 Yahoo’s debt/equity ratio was relatively stable though economic 
conditions were significantly changing. This suggests that Yahoo’s debt/equity ratio is 
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affected by its financial policy. The last time Yahoo! Inc. had a significantly higher 
debt/equity ratio was in 2003-2004. Around that time internet companies were 
recovering from the dot-com bubble bursting. So it is reasonable for a company to 
have a shortage of funds and to use debt to stay afloat. We also know that Yahoo! Inc. 
was competing heavily with Google at that time and acquired a few companies in 
order to improve their services. Also as the economy was recovering from 2010 
onward the debt/equity ratio has had a slight downward trend. This suggests that 
debt/equity ratio is also affected by market conditions. As the economy improves, 
companies’ earnings typically increase and debt/equity ratio decreases.  
3. Optimal capital structure analysis. 
    As was mentioned above Yahoo! Inc. is underleveraged. There are many 
factors that are not taken into consideration in the spreadsheet that will affect the 
capital structure policy of the firm. Factors such as comparative firms, control 
problems, life cycle, and debt & discipline theory do not explain Yahoo! Inc.’s capital 
structure. Most of firms in related industries have a higher debt/equity ratio than 
Yahoo! Inc. In terms of life cycle Yahoo is a mature firm and is not so risky anymore 
and therefore could have higher debt.  The debt and discipline theory could work 
because most of Yahoo! Inc. shareholders are outsiders unlike Microsoft. Nevertheless, 
Yahoo! Inc. has very low debt and it is clear they are not using debt to stimulate their 
managers. Managers in the firm seem to be adequately responsive to Yahoo 
stockholders. The firm set up and email alert system, which gives investors alerts and 
instant access to all the company’s financial information and events. Upon signing up 
for these alerts, investors will be notified when any important press releases are made 
public, all SEC filings, including quarterly and annual reports and large insider 
transactions, and any webcasts or events that Yahoo holds such as financial 
conferences and stockholder’s meetings. Yahoo also allows investors the ability to 
sign up to have all SEC filings, such as the 10-K, annual reports and Proxy statements 
printed and mailed to their household so they have hardcopies of the information.   
However, factors like intangible assets, flexibility, and pecking-order theory 
can help to explain Yahoo’s policy. Since a good portion of Yahoo! Inc.’s assets are 
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intangible it has a higher risk and higher bankruptcy costs. The company should not 
have as much debt as other companies with more tangible assets. This could be one 
reason that explains Yahoo! Inc.’s lower than optimal debt/equity ratio.  Also Yahoo 
has made good investments in the past, which was only possible because of the 
flexibility the company had. Yahoo! Inc. has bought and resold several companies. 
One of the most recent and successful investment projects was the investment in 
Alababa Group.  
The pecking-order theory could explain why it does not have much debt. 
According to the pecking-order theory managers prefer to use internal funds to 
finance investments if possible over debt and equity. Therefore if the company had 
enough internal funds to support its investments it never had much need for debt. 
  Yahoo has other deductions to reduce the tax bite. The main one being 
depreciation of $481M. This might be another reason as to why Yahoo! Inc. has 
decided to not take so much debt. The depreciation definitely helps to soften the effect 
of taxes. Following the trade-off theory Yahoo! Inc. might believe that their tax shield 
is sufficient and their risk of bankruptcy is too costly and outweighs the use of more 
debt.      
   How easy is it for bondholders to observe what equity investors are doing? Are the 
assets tangible or intangible? If not, what are the costs in terms of monitoring 
stockholders or in terms of bond covenants? 
 It is relatively easy for bondholders to observe what equity investors are doing 
because the information is easily found in the 10-K and the other quarterly reports. 
The firm has both tangible and intangible assets. According to the company’s balance 
sheet, goodwill and intangible assets account for $5,132,210,000 of their total 
$14,905,795,000 worth of assets so there is a fairly even breakdown of intangible and 
tangible assets. Throughout 2012, Yahoo continued to purchase more intangible assets, 
such as intellectual property rights and developed technology, which saw amortization 
expenses for the company rise 7% compared to the year before.  
    How well can this firm forecast its future investment opportunities and needs? 
How much does it value flexibility? 
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 The firm values flexibility very much. As recently as the end of the third quarter 
of 2013, Yahoo generated free cash flow of $249 million and returned an 
additional $1.7 billion to shareholders through buybacks. Their balance sheet had $3.2 
billion in cash and securities, which made them well positioned with ample liquidity 
to fund future investments for growth. Yahoo has more than $4.5 billion dollars of 
long-term investments alone according to their balance sheet for the end of quarter 
three. With more than $3.2 billion in cash and securities, they have a lot of financial 
flexibility should any good opportunities arise for them to make smart investments 
regarding their future.  
4. Recommendations regarding firm’s capital structure. 
 The main recommendation we can make regarding the firm’s capital structure 
would be to add more debt. Following the idea that debt does indeed add discipline to 
a company and to the company’s managers, Yahoo has room to add more debt and still 
be able to deal with it comfortably, while it gives them incentive to work harder, 
invest smarter and grow more rapidly in the future. Looking at Yahoo’s total debt of 
roughly $121,000,000 and comparing that to companies in the same industry, such as 
Microsoft and Google, who have debts of $16 billion and $7 billion dollars 
respectively, Yahoo’s debt is far less than both of them. From seeing the rapid growth 
of Google into one of the largest companies in the world, with a stock price of over 
$1,000, Yahoo may want to look into a larger debt as that may be one of the reasons 
why Google is growing at such a rapid pace and why their stock prices have 
skyrocketed in recent times. 
Of course there would be negative results that come from raising the debt as 
well (especially if debt is raised by too much), such as higher risk of bankruptcy 
(higher bankruptcy costs), less flexibility. In addition, too much debt could lead to 
problems like debt overhang. All considered we still believe the benefits outweigh the 
risks and Yahoo! Inc. needs to use more debt as part of the capital structure. 
5.3. Look Smart. 
Table 4. Results for LookSmart.  
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D/(D+E) 
Ratio 
Beta for the  
Stock  
Cost of 
Equity    
Cost of 
Debt  WACC 
Market Value of 
Firm (mln)  
              
Current 
capital 
structure 22.02% 0.84 9.03% 13.53% 10.02% 18  
Optimal 
capital 
structure 0.00% 0.66  7.13% 3.27% 7.13% 25  
Change -22.02% -0.18 -1.90% -10.26% -2.89% $7  
 
LookSmart, Ltd. (“LookSmart” or the “Company”) is a search and display advertising 
network solutions company that provides relevant solutions for search and display 
advertising customers. LookSmart was organized in 1996 and is incorporated in the 
State of Delaware 
  In December 1997, the Company approved the 1998 Stock Option Plan (the “Plan”). 
In June 2007, the stockholders approved the LookSmart 2007 Equity Incentive Plan 
(the “2007 Plan”). Under the 2007 Plan, the Company may grant incentive stock 
options, nonqualified stock options, stock appreciation rights and stock rights to 
employees, directors and consultants. Share-based incentive awards are provided 
under the terms of these two plans. 
   The Company’s Plans are administered by the Compensation Committee of the 
Board of Directors. Awards under the Plans principally include at-the-money options 
and fully vested restricted stock. Outstanding stock options generally become 
exercisable over a four year period from the grant date and have a term of seven years. 
Grants can only be made under the 2007 Plan. The 1998 Plan is closed to further share 
issuance. The number of shares reserved for issuance under the Plans was 4.1 million 
and 4.3 million shares of common stock for the years ended December 31, 2012 and 
2011, respectively. There were 1.9 million shares available to be granted under the 
2007 Plan at December 31, 2012. At the same time, the company doesn’t have long 
time debt.  
Like other small firms LookSmart is “damaged” in that they are struggling to survive. 
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LookSmart is plagued with cutbacks, legal actions and loss of their consumer base 
which lower revenues and increase expenses. This company is very high in risk and 
has very little support from potential investors and creditors. These companies have 
little access to loans and have exhausted their equity opportunities and must survive 
through private placements which are low in cost and custom-designed for the 
company. 
5.4. Rediff.com 
Table 5. Results for Rediff.com 
  
D/(D+E) 
Ratio 
Beta for the  
Stock  Cost of Equity    Cost of Debt  WACC 
Market Value of 
Firm (mln.)  
              
Current 
capital 
structure 1.42% 4.85 50.58% 13.71% 50.05% 102  
Optimal 
capital 
structure 0.00% 4.78  49.86% 3.32% 49.86% 102  
Change -1.42% -0.07 -0.72% -10.39% -0.19% $0  
 
For small business in international information provider industry, Rediff debt/equity 
ratio is higher than optimal. I think the reason is that small businesses almost do not 
have much profit, so they think they have to borrow funds. We know, however, that 
the tax advantage of debt is not as important as for a big firm. And comparing with 
debt financing, there are more advantage in equity financing like less bankruptcy cost, 
less agency cost, more financing flexibility. 
  In fact, revenue of many small companies in international information provider 
industry is not enough to pay for his financing cost. In my opinion, it is very 
important to make sure that you can earn enough money to pay for your financing 
payment. 
5.5. Some other observations    
  Small companies such as Paid, Move and Dynamic Leisure use different capital 
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structures. Paid, Inc. engaged in multiple long-term convertible notes to help fund the 
development and launch of a new service which will provide them enough revenue so 
they need not outsource for future financing. Move uses long-term debt for long-term 
capital leases and Dynamic Leisure Corp. was bought out by another company which 
took out a long-term loan shortly after to fund a growth-through-acquisition strategy. 
All three companies struggle to earn profits or have none at all which makes risky 
companies that do not benefit by the trade-off associated with debt financing. 
Creditors are in the business to make money from lending theirs and are not interested 
in making risky or faulty investments. Debt-financing opportunities for Paid, Move 
and Dynamic are limited and costly and may hinder their future operations through 
putting strains on cash flows and restricting investments.    
  We observe that many of these small companies in their infancy stages are 
undergoing rapid growth and with it, large losses as all funds are being tunneled into 
investments and development. These companies bankruptcy costs outweigh tax 
benefits for potential loans the debt will be associated with high interest rates and 
restrictive covenants to protect the creditors. Secondly, a small number of the firms 
are “damaged” in that they are struggling to survive. Some of these companies such as 
LookSmart are plagued with cutbacks, legal actions and loss of their consumer base 
which lower revenues and increase expenses. Aptimus and others suffered during the 
tech crash of early 2000 which diminished the value high expectations for some of the 
firms. These companies are very high in risk and have very little support from 
potential investors and creditors. These companies have little access to loans and have 
exhausted their equity opportunities and must survive through private placements 
which are low in cost and custom-designed for the company.     
  
7. Summary of Analysis and Recommendations 
1. Our analysis shows that most large companies in the Internet industry are 
underleveraged. Low debt ratio is hurting the companies’ profitability.  In recent 
years some companies began to realize that using tax shields can be beneficial. 
However, they use other ideas than debt tax shield. Google, for instance, has been 
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paying taxes in countries with lower tax rates for last 4 years. We think that one of the 
reasons why managers do not use debt tax shield is that they think that the capital cost 
of using internal funds is lower than issue debt.  Based on this view, managers will 
overuse the internal funds.  For those companies, our recommendation will be issue 
more debt to increase the companies’ profitability.  There are also some natural 
reasons for not using debt. These may include agency cost of debt and loss of 
flexibility. However, many companies are underleveraged even taking other factors 
into consideration. 
2. Most small companies in the Internet industry are overleveraged. So they should 
have less debt. For some small companies, the cost of issuing new equity is naturally 
very high (asymmetric information problems). However, many companies 
underestimate long-term problems of carrying too much debt mostly flexibility loss. 
Also we think it is a good idea to use preferred stocks. 
3. Third, internet companies can use international financing more efficiently. 
International debt has advantages not just for governments but for corporations and 
individuals as well. Corporations can raise international debt in different currencies. 
The currency differential doesn’t just diversify risk, it helps to shop for lower interest 
rates in a limitless international market. Rates in international markets are normally 
lower than domestic sources of capital. This is largely because there are many major 
firms and banks involved in these transactions, creating an inherent stability in the 
market. In addition, given the fact that there are many currencies involved in many 
transactions, the overall risk is lower to the lending institution, since any fluctuations 
in the currencies and the local markets are balanced out by the others. Also 
international market have greater flexibility. International capital markets like 
euro-currency are under no capitalization restrictions. This means there are no 
required reserves for all institutions to maintain to cushion their risk. As a result, these 
markets can lend 100 percent of their deposits, which is possible given the lack of risk 
in comparison to purely domestic institutions. Given the fact that international trade 
continues to grow, international markets continue to appear as a good bet to hedge 
against the possibility of local currency appreciation or market recessions. Finally, 
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access to global capital markets can allow a firm to reduce its cost of capital. 
Companies seek a lower cost of capital through mergers and acquisitions, foreign 
direct investment, and other global activities. A competitive cost of capital depends on 
firm-specific characteristics that attract international portfolio investors and the 
liberalization of markets where companies have the freedom to source capital in liquid 
markets. 
4. Using one theory cannot explain all capital structure strategies of Internet 
industry companies. We should use multiple theories to explain the capital structure in 
this industry. We find that the optimal capital structure determined by the trade-off 
theory (spreadsheet analysis) usually differs from the actual financing mix we observe 
in the industry. The pecking order theory can explain why small firms with no large 
cash reserves prefer debt to equity and why well-established and financially healthy 
firms do not use external financing. It fails to explain, however, why most companies 
(especially young and/or growing companies with large expansionary expenditures) 
prefer large equity issues to bond issues or even other types of debt. Signaling theory 
of capital structure cannot explain why most internet firms do not use debt as a signal 
of firm quality. The market timing hypothesis provides good explanations for timing 
of firms IPOs. For example, nearly all companies issue equity through public 
offerings at opportune times, most notably during the “tech craze” or “dot.com 
bubble” of the late 1990s. We also see firms undergo public offerings when the market 
has recovered from the tech crash of 2000 or at other times when management feels 
their stock is overvalued. We see companies make stock repurchases at windows of 
opportunities where they believe their stock is undervalued. We feel however, that 
from a broader point of view, the market timing theory is limited in explaining firm’s 
capital structure besides IPO decision.  
5. Flexibility is underexplored area. Both equity and debt holders do place value on 
flexibility, especially in the recent years of turmoil in capital markets. Managers 
surveys show that managers value flexibility when choosing their capital structures. 
We think new quantitative approaches in valuing flexibility should be developed. 
Managers are also concerned about credit ratings, as observed anecdotally in the press 
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and through survey results. Future capital structure research would benefit from 
including credit ratings as part of the capital structure framework, to obtain a more 
comprehensive depiction of capital structure behavior. 
6. Theories of capital structure should take into account that it’s been a shift from 
shareholders value maximization strategy to stakeholders value optimization. We 
think that internet companies demonstrate shift from shareholders value maximization 
strategy to stakeholders value optimization. One of the dramatic changes created by 
the expanding global economy is the increase in the rate of change within industries. 
As more industries are experiencing greater levels of change, we will find the use of 
Equity-centered governance will prove less effective in the near future. We feel that 
this aspect of behavior is undeveloped especially in North America versus Europe for 
example. The first duty of managers is to ensure the long-term survival of the 
organization within its competitive environment. In a world devoted to quick fixes, 
and short-term thinking edited by sound bites, it is difficult to take time to think 
through serious challenges. As environments become more competitive, those who 
make the time to reach appropriate decisions will be the ones left standing.  
7. We feel that the Traditional Theories have a lot of room for improvement. The 
pecking order theory cannot explain why many firms in internet industry do not prefer 
debt over equity. We feel that recent papers about dynamic pecking order theory are 
promising where managers may sometime find attractive to issue equity (see, for 
example, Miglo (2008)). Next, one needs to develop Dynamic versions of Trade-Off 
Theory of Capital structure. Constructing models that recognize the role of time 
requires specifying a number of aspects that are typically ignored in a single-period 
model. Of particular importance are the roles of expectations and adjustment costs.  
In the future, financial economists need to continue developing dynamic versions of 
each theory or to develop new models that incorporate both trade-off and pecking 
order ideas. More research may be required to create new models that can compete 
with trade-off and pecking order theories.   
8. Finally, a popular line of inquiry based on surveys of managers about their capital 
structure decisions seems to be promising. For example, Graham and Harvey (2001) 
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report a large gap between theory and practice. 
9. In terms of debate about future development of capital structure theory, we disagree 
with Harris and Raviv (1991) opinion that asymmetric information theories are less 
promising. We feel that existing asymmetric information theories are not sufficient 
and this is the reason why these theories have less support than the trade-off theory 
among managers and students. We find that asymmetric information is important in 
explaining many patterns of capital structure behavior of internet companies but 
managers do not have a practical tool to use it more efficiently. At the same time 
given that the gap between theory and practice is very large, we agree with Harris and 
Raviv (1991) in that the door is still widely open for new theory of capital structure 
which can be helpful to make a bridge between managers and students which can be 
helpful to the future students to know more clear about capital structure.  
 
                         8. Conclusions 
We analyze the financing decisions and capital structure of internet companies and 
relate observed findings to the common capital structure theories. Large internet 
companies usually have low debt and small internet companies have high debt. We 
find that the trade-off theory of capital structure, pecking order theory, market timing 
theory and other theories cannot individually determine a firm’s capital structure and 
their use of sources of financing accurately but can compliment each other to help 
explain observed behavior. We also suggest a number of recommendations for capital 
structure theory and practice.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. The list of companies 
 
 Company Ticker Long-Term 
Debt (in $US 
thousands) 
Market 
Capitalization (in 
$US millions) 
1 Accelerize New Media, lnc. ACLZ 480.31 26.2 
2 Akamai Technologies, lnc. AKAM 0 6600 
3 Ancestry.com lnc. ACOM 0 1300 
4 AOL lnc. AOL 108400 3400 
5 Atrinsic, lnc. ATRNQ 4020 16.6 
6 Autobytel lnc. ABTL 500 34.9 
7 Baidu, lnc. BIDU 452980 39500 
8 Bankrate, lnc. RATE 193770 1100 
9 Biozone Pharmaceuticals, lnc. BZNE 5530 104.7 
10 Bitauto Holdings Limited BITA 0 197.2 
11 Blucora, lnc. BCOR 74580 714.4 
12 CafePress lnc. PRSS 2940 97.2 
13 China Finance Online Co., Ltd JRJC 21140 27.5 
14 ChinaCache International Holdi CCIH 272.72 109.9 
15 Ediets.com lnc.  DIET 1010 18.9 
16 Facebook, lnc. FB 706000 40700 
17 Firefish, lnc. FRFS 53.85 N/A 
18 FrogAds, lnc. FROG 361.87 N/A 
19 Global Sources Ltd. GSOL 0 188.6 
20 Google lnc. GOOG 7890000 223500 
21 Groupon, lnc. GRPN 0 3200 
22 Healthstream lnc. HSTM 0 742.3 
23 HomeAway, lnc. AWAY 0 2100 
24 IAC/InterActiveCorp IACI 95840 4600 
25 Immediatek lnc. IMKI 5.7 24.6 
26 Internet Media Services, lnc. ITMV 570.67 0.2 
27 Interxion Holding NV INXN 333700 1500 
28 Jiayuan.com International Ltd. DATE 0 197.1 
29 Kayak Software Corporation  KYAK 0 1200 
30 Kiwibox.Com, lnc. KIWB 8860 6.8 
31 Linkedln Corporation LNKD 0 11300 
32 LiveDeal, lnc. LIVE 129.94 9.2 
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33 Local Corporation LOCM 8000 59.4 
34 LookSmart, Ltd. LOOK 313 14 
35 Medient Studios, lnc. MDNT 3.5 1.8 
36 MeetMe, lnc. MEET 11880 147.3 
37 Mister Goody, lnc. MSGO 0 9 
38 MMRGlobal, lnc. MMRF 3440 8.7 
39 Monster Offers MONT 49.5 6.3 
40 Move, lnc. MOVE 0 319.2 
41 Net Savings Link, lnc. NSAV 222.34 N/A 
42 OpenTable, lnc. OPEN 0 985.2 
43 Options Media Group Holdings OPMG 1220 2.1 
44 PeopleString Corporation PLPE 0 0.8 
45 Phoenix New Media Limited FENG 0 288.3 
46 Reach Messaging Holdings, lnc. RCMH 264.87 N/A 
47 Rediff.com India Limited REDF 0 109 
48 Remark Media, lnc. MARK 464.21 10.2 
49 Renren lnc. RENN 0 1300 
50 Shutterfly, lnc. SFLY 0 1100 
51 Sohu.com lnc. SOHO 0 1500 
52 SouFun Holdings Ltd. SFUN 270570 1400 
53 SpectrumDNA, lnc. SPXA 9.09 0.7 
54 Subaye, lnc. SBAY 0 N/A 
55 SurePure, lnc. SURP 0 40.6 
56 Synacor, lnc. SYNC 5140 165.4 
57 Sync2 Networks Corp SYNW 807.98 N/A 
58 TechTarget, lnc. TTGT 0 199 
59 Theglobe.com lnc. TGLO 500 N/A 
60 TheStreet, lnc. TST 0 51.6 
61 Travelzoo lnc. TZOO 0 286.5 
62 TripAdvisor lnc. TRIP 414360 4300 
63 Tucows lnc. TCX 4000 53.7 
64 Vacation Home Swap, lnc. VCHS 35.73 2.06 
65 ValueClick, lnc. VCLK 172500 1200 
66 Web.com Group, lnc. WWWW 694780 817.7 
67 WebXU, lnc. WBXU 2310 7.1 
68 Yahoo! Lnc. YHOO 39000 18760 
69 Yelp, lnc. YELP 0 1500 
70 Youku Tudou lnc. YOKU 2070 2300 
71 Zynga, lnc. ZNGA 100000 1800 
 
Appendix 2. Input data. 
Financial Information   
Earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (EBITDA) $1,756.00  
Depreciation and Amortization: $323.00  
Market Information   
Number of shares outstanding:    
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1,080,000,000  
Market price per share: $0.0000263400  
Beta of the stock: 1.70 
Book value of debt: $1,432.00  
The market value of debt: $1,432.00  
Do you have any operating leases? Yes 
General Market Data   
Current long-term (LT) government bond rate: 2.78% 
Short-term interest rate 1.80% 
Risk premium (for use in the CAPM) 11.90% 
Country default spread (for cost of debt)  0.00% 
  
 
Appendix 3. Lease obligations 
 
Inputs         
Operating lease expense in current year 
=       $537.00  
Operating Lease Commitments (From 
footnote to financials)         
Year Commitment 
! Year 1 is 
next year, ….     
1  $    540.00        
2  $    406.00        
3  $    242.00        
4  $    130.00        
5  $    117.00        
6 and beyond  $    395.00        
          
Pre-tax Cost of Debt =   170.00%     
          
Output         
Number of years embedded in yr 6 
estimate =     1   
          
Converting Operating Leases into debt         
Year Commitment Present Value     
1  $    540.00  $540.00      
2  $    406.00  $406.00      
3  $    242.00  $242.00      
4  $    130.00  $130.00      
5  $    117.00  $117.00      
6 and beyond  $    395.00  $146.30      
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Debt Value of leases =    $ 1,581.30      
 
Appendix 4. Debt 
 
Bank medium-term debt 899 899 
Bank long-term debt 398 398 
Bonds 0 0 
Unsecured debentures and 
notes 0 0 
Senior debt securities 0 0 
Senior medium-term notes 0 0 
Subordinated medium-term 
notes 0 0 
Other notes 135 135 
Total 1432 1432 
 
Appendix 5. Tax rate 
 
Facebook’s TAX RATE  
Quarter 2012/9/29 2012/6/30 2012/3/30 
Earnings before tax -383 382 520 
Provision for taxes 48 177 218 
Tax rate -12.53% 46.34% 41.92% 
Average tax rate, TC 25.24%     
 
 
Appendix 6. Calculations 
 
Table 4               
D/(D+E) D/E Debt Beta Cost of Equity 
Operating 
Inc. Depreciation Interests 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00 1.57 20.50% $1,756  $323  $0  
5.00% 5.26% 1561.63 1.63 21.23% $1,756  $323  $52  
10.00% 11.11% 3154.76 1.70 22.05% $1,756  $323  $104  
15.00% 17.65% 4780.35 1.78 22.96% $1,756  $323  $158  
20.00% 25.00% 6439.40 1.86 23.99% $1,756  $323  $213  
25.00% 33.33% 8132.96 1.96 25.16% $1,756  $323  $268  
30.00% 42.86% 9816.45 2.07 26.49% $1,756  $323  $363  
35.00% 53.85% 11517.44 2.20 28.02% $1,756  $323  $461  
40.00% 66.67% 13232.66 2.35 29.82% $1,756  $323  $562  
45.00% 81.82% 14951.52 2.53 31.93% $1,756  $323  $673  
50.00% 100.00% 16587.48 2.75 34.48% $1,756  $323  $829  
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55.00% 122.22% 18380.03 3.01 37.58% $1,756  $323  $919  
60.00% 150.00% 19961.29 3.33 41.47% $1,756  $323  $1,098  
65.00% 185.71% 21762.25 3.75 46.46% $1,756  $323  $1,197  
70.00% 233.33% 23262.71 4.31 53.11% $1,756  $323  $1,396  
75.00% 300.00% 24338.67 5.10 62.43% $1,756  $323  $1,704  
80.00% 400.00% 26047.03 6.27 76.41% $1,756  $323  $1,823  
85.00% 566.67% 26886.25 8.23 99.71% $1,756  $323  $2,151  
90.00% 900.00% 27578.94 12.14 146.30% $1,756  $323  $2,482  
95.00% 1900.00% 29096.43 23.89 286.08% $1,756  $323  $2,619  
5. MAIN RESULTS 
Table 5               
  
D/(D+E) 
Ratio   
Beta for the  
Stock  Cost of Equity    Cost of Debt    WACC 
                
Current 
capital 
structure 9.88%   1.70 22.03% 2.30%   20.08% 
Optimal 
capital 
structure 65.00%   3.75 46.46% 4.11%   18.93% 
Change 55.12%   2.05 24.43% 1.81%   -1.15% 
 
 
